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Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Routing for Large-Scale Wireless Sensor
Networks Based on Fast ECDSA
Jiawei Xu , Keda Wang, Chao Wang, Feng Hu, Zhenhua Zhang, Shiyi Xu, and Jie Wu
Abstract: Wireless sensor networks are a favorite target of Byzantine malicious attackers because of their limited
energy, low calculation capability, and dynamic topology, and other important characteristics. The Byzantine
Generals Problem is one of the classical problems in the area of fault tolerance, and has wide application, especially
in distributed databases and systems. There is a lot of research in agreement and replication techniques that
tolerate Byzantine faults. However, most of this work is not suited to large-scale wireless sensor networks, due to its
high computational complexity. By introducing Fast ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm), which can
resist timing and energy attacks, and reduce the proportion of verifying signature algorithm to generating signature
algorithm to 1.2 times, we propose a new Byzantine fault-tolerant routing algorithm for large-scale wireless sensor
networks with double-level hierarchical architecture. In different levels, the algorithm runs different BFT protocols.
Theory and simulation results have proved that this algorithm has high security and the number of communication
rounds between clusters is reduced by 1/3, which balances the network load. At the same time, the application of
Fast ECDSA improves the security level of the network without burdening it.
Key words: wireless sensor networks; Byzantine Generals Problem; fault-tolerant routing; Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA); LEACH-protocol
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Introduction

In a wireless sensor network, malicious nodes are
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referred to as Byzantine nodes, which are caused by
software bugs, operation mistakes, missing keys, energy
exhaustion, or attacks. Large-scale wireless sensor
networks are collections of a substantial number of
nodes deployed in rugged surroundings. The topology
of the network is dynamic, and each node is a potential
routing node, making the network more vulnerable to be
attacked. The influence of Byzantine nodes is important
to the reliability and the usability of the entire network.
Because of the serious resource constraints of sensors,
traditional public-key cryptographies such as RSA and
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
cannot be used in this case. Therefore, the design
of lightweight Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols may
enhance the fault-tolerant ability of large-scale wireless
sensor networks.
The Byzantine Generals Problem has been mainly
employed in solving fault-tolerance and credibility
problems in modern cryptography and distributed
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systems, and is widely used in military, financial,
and Internet research. Recently, research on Byzantine
fault-tolerant problems in LANs and WANs has made
great progress. In 2008, Liskov and Rodrigues[1] made
a great breakthrough in Web systems by using the
Byzantine fault-tolerant problem. In the same year,
Vandiver[2] described the design, implementation, and
evaluation of a replication scheme to handle Byzantine
faults in transaction processing database systems. In
2010, Amir et al.[3] presented the first hierarchical
Byzantine fault-tolerant replication architecture suitable
for systems that cover multiple disjoint sites. The
security of this algorithm is based on the RSA publickey cryptosystem, which is inferior to the new research
public-key cryptosystem ECC in both computational
complexity and in the key size, and the RSA algorithm
cannot be used in a wireless sensor network. Wu et
al.[4] wrote a short note about Byzantine fault-tolerant
protocols in a survey of attacks and countermeasures
in MANET. Hsieh[5] and Liu et al.[6] have also
reported research about Byzantine fault-tolerant in
MANET. In 2013, Vempaty et al.[7] analyzed the
effect of false information from the Byzantines on
target state estimation and obtained the minimum
fraction of Byzantines that “blinds” the fusion center. In
the same year, Lin et al.[8] proposed an energyefficient cooperative geographic routing to reach
energy-efficient routing in wireless sensor networks. In
2014, Koh et al.[9] proposed a dynamic witness
concept together with distributed forwarder node
monitoring to validate the transmitted fusion data. This
scheme offered better resilience against Byzantine
nodes and improved energy efficiency compared to
existing witness-based approaches. In the same year,
Vempaty et al.[10] investigated system design issues
in FDR-based distributed detection and demonstrated
that improved system design may be achieved by
employing the Kolmogorov–Smirnov distance metric
instead of the deflection coefficient. They also analyzed
the performance of FDR-based distributed detection in
the presence of Byzantines. In 2015, Bhuiyan et al.[11]
and Li et al.[12] presented an approach to make the WSN
resilient to the faults, called FTSHM. This approach
guarantees a specified degree of fault tolerance and
searches the repair points in clusters in a distributed
manner, and places a set of back-up sensors at those
points in such a way that still satisfies the engineering
requirements. In the same year, Zhou et al.[13] from
Tsinghua University applied WiFi to sensor networks

to balance between low cost and high accuracy.
This paper proposes a new Byzantine fault-tolerant
routing algorithm for large-scale wireless sensor
networks. This algorithm has high security and the
number of communication rounds between clusters is
reduced by 1/3. By using the Fast ECDSA algorithm,
which can resist timing and energy attacks, we can
decrease the proportion of verifying signature algorithm
and accelerate the speed of signature algorithm by 1.2
times. In so doing, the security level of the algorithm is
increased without aggravating communication.

2

BFT Protocol

The Byzantine Generals Problem was derived from
military problems during the Byzantine Empire period
(5th to 15th century)[14] . The original Byzantine
army problem supposed that several divisions of the
Byzantine army surrounded a town occupied by the
enemy. Each division was led by a general (commander)
and the generals were allowed to communicate with
each other only by means of messengers. Assume
that some generals might become traitors who
would deliberately deliver an incorrect message to
others. Therefore, care should be taken by each general
in case one receives incorrect messages, and all the final
decisions should be made on the basis of a majority
agreement, so that no betrayed general can disturb the
military plan. Three conditions should be considered:
(1) No solutions can be made if more than 1/3 of the
generals betrayed their positions.
(2) A solution can be obtained by using an Oral
Message (OM) algorithm as the number of betrayed
generals accounting for less than 1/3.
(3) A solution can be obtained by using a Signed
Message (SM) algorithm as the number of loyal
generals accounting for more than 2/3.
The BFT protocol is a Byzantine Fault Tolerance
asynchronous protocol, developed by Castro and Liskov
using the Quorum system and state machine replication
technology[15] . It was used to resolve a number of
unknown Byzantine error node problems. BFT uses an
elected leader to coordinate the protocol and proceed
through a series of views. Considering network energy
consumption and password authentication problems,
the role of leading node is taken by the cluster head node
in our algorithm. When a leading node changes into
a non-trusted one, it requires the other nodes to elect
a new leading node within the cluster, and refresh the

Jiawei Xu et al.: Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Routing for Large-Scale Wireless Sensor Networks Based on Fast ECDSA

view information of the cluster, but there is no need of
redistributing the cluster. The network structure and role
differentiation will be introduced in the next section.
The BFT protocol goes through three rounds of
communication to ensure the information’s consistency
with the cluster view, and requires that a majority of
nodes reaches agreement in every round. Supposing
the cluster has f Byzantine error nodes, and the total
number of nodes in the cluster is less than 3f C 1,
so it needs no less than 2f C 1 nodes to agree with
every communication. In the first round of the BFT
communication protocol, the leading node updates the
local number of nodes with updated information by
broadcasting a pre-prepared message to give other
nodes this updated information and the number in their
cluster. In the second round of the BFT communication
protocol, the nodes that have received the pre-prepared
message will broadcast a prepared message to the
other nodes. When some nodes receive a pre-prepared
message and 2f prepared messages (Prepare Certificate
Status), they emit Commit messages in the cluster, and
the third round communication of the BFT protocol
begins. During the third round of communication, if
some nodes receive 2f C 1 Commit messages, it means
that the updated information has passed through the
coherence protocol and has been executed.

3

Algorithm Framework

Aiming at large-scale wireless sensor networks with
double-level hierarchical architecture, this paper
proposes a new Byzantine fault-tolerant routing
algorithm. The algorithm requires at least 3f C 1
nodes to tolerate f Byzantine nodes to ensure the
fault-tolerant ability.
The algorithm framework is described as follows:
 Complete an OM.f / algorithm between the nodes
at the local level by running three rounds of the
BFT protocol.
 Using lighted threshold digital signatures based on
Fast ECDSA to ensure communication security in
the cluster.
 The messages sent from the cluster head take a
signature based on Fast ECDSA.
 At the global level, the cluster-head nodes
complete the OM.f / algorithm by running two
rounds of an optimal BFT protocol.
 At the routing level, the algorithm uses a security
enhancement algorithm, including Authentication
factor and Certainty factor.

4
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Feasibility Simulation Analysis

To evaluate the feasibility of our algorithm, we propose
theory and simulation analysis between two preset
algorithms. The simulation platform is OPNET Model
Release 14.5.
Considering the common case, we suppose N to
be the total number of nodes in a wireless sensor
network, with f Byzantine malicious nodes. The
communication message and the round number are
important parameters with which we can analyze
the network usage and data processing rate of the
algorithm. We define the number of data packets
sent in a communication round as the communication
message. One round is the time starting from when
some node begins broadcasting information until
all the other nodes receive the information. So a
communication round is defined as the total number of
rounds needed to finish the communication.
Preset algorithm I, running an OM algorithm at
the global level, needs at least f C 1 rounds of
communication. The total communication messages are
F .N;f / D .N 1/.N 2/    .N f 1/.
For Preset algorithm II, running an SM algorithm
in clusters, the communication message is F .M; f / D
.M 1/.M 2/    .M f 1/, and running an
SM algorithm between different clusters, the
communication message is F .k;f / D .k 1/.k 2/
   .k f
1/. Preset algorithm II needs at least
2.f C 1/ rounds communication, and the total amount
of communication messages is F .M; f / C MF .k; f /.
As a preset algorithm running an OM algorithm at
the global level, Preset algorithm II is the prototype
of our algorithm. Preset algorithm II divides N nodes
into M clusters; each cluster contains k nodes. Figures
1 and 2 are the result we obtained from the matching
communication messages with the communication
rounds in different N and different r D f =N .
From the comparison results above, we find that in
the same N and r D f =N , a hierarchical architecture
needs more communication rounds, but its total
communication messages and network consumptions
both decrease rapidly.
In this paper, the new algorithm runs on different
Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols for different levels,
yielding a greater reduction in communication rounds
than with the traditional hierarchical architecture. The
total communication messages have been reduced
2
to F .M; f / C MF .k; f /. Meanwhile, the new
3
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Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Contrast between communication rounds.

Contrast between total communication messages.

algorithm brings in the Fast ECDSA algorithm. The
security level has thus been greatly enhanced without
aggravating the communication.

5
5.1

Algorithm Description
Lightweight threshold scheme based on Fast
ECDSA

The Fast ECDSA implementation process in our
algorithm is as follows: First, it defines an elliptic curve
domain parameter D D .O; a; b; p/, where O is the
finite field GF.p n /, a; b 2 GF(p n ), p is a base point. If
node A sends a message m to node B, the Fast ECDSA
signature generation is as follows:
(1) A selects a secret random integer k; kA 2
Œ1; n 1;
(2) A computes kG D .x1 ; y1 / (where y1 is not
needed to perform the computation) and r D x1 mod
p1n ;
(3) A computes k 1 mod p1n ;
(4) A computes e D MD5.m/;
(5) A computes s D k 1 .e C rkA / mod p1n ; if s D
0, then return to Step (1);

(6) The Fast ECDSA signature of message m is the
integers .r; s/; A sends .m kr ks kkA / to B.
The signature verification process is as follows:
(1) When B receives the signature, it must verify that
r and s are integers in the interval Œ1; n 1. If any
verification fails then the signature is rejected.
(2) B computes e D MD5.m/ and w D s 1 mod p1n ;
(3) B computes u1 D ew mod p1n and u2 D rw mod
n
p1 ;
(4) B compute a D .u1 C u2  kA / mod p1n ;
(5) B compute a multiplying point of a  G and v D
x1 mod p1n on a Montgomery curve;
(6) If v D r, then the signature of A is accepted.
Simulation result shows that using a Fast ECDSA
algorithm can reduce the time ratio to verify and
generate the signature from 2 to 1.2, a reduction of
about 40%. The point multiplication uses a binary shift
NAF coding algorithm, while adopting point addition
and point multiplication of the not calculated value
of y under Projective coordinate, thus avoiding many
modular inverse algorithms. The detailed algorithm can
be viewed in the author’s research paper on the ECDSA
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algorithm based on Montgomery-form ECC[16] .
Each cluster has a security certificate whose
security is based on a Montgomery-type elliptic
curve cryptosystem, which is sent to the cluster
head node of each cluster by the base station; at
the same time, it uses a Fast ECDSA algorithm to
optimize the lightweight design of a .2f C 1; 3f C 1/
threshold scheme[17] . Suppose that the cluster contains
f Byzantine error nodes, and the total number of
nodes in the cluster is less than 3f C 1, so each
communication round needs no less than 2f C 1 nodes
to agree with it.
Each cluster has a public key and a private key. The
public key is divided into a partial key, allocated
to each node in the cluster, which can be used by
each node to partially sign for information. Each node
has information that can verify the effectiveness of
each partial signature in the cluster; the cluster head
node can integrate information for the collected partial
signatures in some clusters. The other nodes can only
communicate with the remaining nodes in the same
cluster; the cluster head node can achieve not only
communication between a cluster and base station, but
also communication among the clusters. Each piece of
information sent by the cluster head carries a digital
signature based on Fast ECDSA.
5.2

Different Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols for
different levels

The local level runs three rounds of BFT protocol to
eliminate the effects of Byzantine nodes. Suppose each
message sent from a cluster head is correct and safe;
communication at the global level is effected by each
cluster head. The cluster head disseminates messages to
the other cluster heads, receives global messages, and
distributes them to the local nodes.
The cluster-head nodes complete an OM.f /
algorithm by running two rounds of an optimal BFT
protocol at the global level. Running two rounds of
an optimal BFT protocol at the global level is much
simpler than at the local level. In the first round,
the base station assigns a sequence number to a
message and sends a proposal message containing
this assignment to the other cluster heads. In the
second round, any cluster head receiving the proposal
sends an accept message, acknowledging the proposal,
to the rest of cluster heads. When a cluster head
receives a proposal message and bs=2c matching accept
messages—it orders the corresponding behavior. A

631

detailed description of the algorithm follows:
(1) A node sends an update that contains a logical
time stamp i to its cluster head. The cluster head
proposes an update with time stamp i C1 after it
receives a reply for an update with time stamp i:
(2) When the base station receives an update, it
assigns a global sequence number to the update; this
assignment is encapsulated in a proposal message and
sent to the other cluster heads. Each cluster head
generates a threshold signature on the constructed
proposal and sends the signed proposal to the other
cluster heads.
(3) When a cluster head receives a signed proposal,
it forwards it to the nodes in its cluster. Upon receiving
a proposal, a node constructs an accept message that
contains a matching partial signature and sends it to its
cluster head. After receiving 2f C 1 accept messages,
the cluster head combines the partial signatures and
sends them to the other cluster heads.
(4) The cluster head forwards the incoming accept
messages to the nodes in its cluster. A node orders
the corresponding behavior after it receives a proposal
message and bs=2c matching accept messages from the
other clusters.
(5) The routing level improves the swarm intelligence
algorithm by using a security enhancement algorithm
that includes an authentication factor and a Certainty
factor. The Ant packet contains public key information
from its upper node, and updates this public key
information to its own. WCredibility .A; B/ represents the
credibility of node B to node A and is influenced by
latency, loss ratio, and dump energy. Its value limits
the routing choice of node A. The improved forward
Ant packet and backward Ant packet are structured as
Fig. 3.
For detailed information about the preparation stage,
setup stage, acquisition latency, and the Wormhole antiattack of the Ant colony algorithm, please refer to
Ref. [18].

6

Conclusions

Wireless sensor networks are a favorite target of
Byzantine malicious attackers for their limited energy,

Fig. 3

Forward Ant packet and backward Ant packet.
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low calculation capability, dynamic topology, and other
special characterics.
We found large-scale wireless sensor networks
to be highly scalable due to their double-level
hierarchical architecture; they excel in network
topology management, energy minimization, and
application to distributed applications.
For an N -node wireless sensor network, suppose
there are S clusters with S cluster-head nodes. The
message exchange complexity has been reduced
from O.N 2 / to O.S 2 / in comparison with a flat
architecture, and the scalability of network has also
been enhanced. The algorithm proposed operates
different rounds of Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol
at different levels, which can reduce the total
communication messages from F .N; f / D .N 1/
2
.N 2/    .N f
1/ to F .M; f / C MF .k; f /;
3
the number of communication rounds between clusters
is reduced by 1/3 which balances the network load
effectively.
Compared with the traditional RSA Public Key
cryptosystem, the new research focus, ECC, gains the
ascendancy in both computational complexity and key
size. By using the Fast ECDSA algorithm, the security
level of the algorithm proposed has been greatly
enhanced without aggravating the communication.
Theory analysis and simulation results prove that this
algorithm has effectively eliminated the effects of
Byzantine nodes, offers balanced energy consumption,
and improves fault-tolerance for a large-scale wireless
sensor network.
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